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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Survey period brought greater focus on the relevance and re-
liability of expert testimony, the importance of the scope of par-
ties' objections, and the important issue of the waiver of privileges.
The Survey period also found the Texas Supreme Court addressing the
appropriateness of spoliation instructions, sanction awards, application of
the thirty-day grace period in the Medical Liability and Insurance Im-
provement Act, and the scope of the confidentiality provisions under the
ADR statute.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The reliability of expert testimony was addressed by both state and fed-
eral courts during this Survey period. The Fifth Circuit and the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the reliability of medical experts, while the
*Partner, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** Associate, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** Associate, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
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state appellate courts focused on reliability, expert methodology, and the
scope of objections.
A. THE FEDERAL DAUBERT CASES
In Vargas v. Lee, the Fifth Circuit reiterated its previous ruling that
purported expert testimony regarding whether trauma causes fibromy-
algia is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence. The Fifth
Circuit had previously held that expert testimony concerning whether
trauma causes fibromyalgia is not sufficiently reliable under Daubert.1 In
Vargas, the court examined whether scientific understanding of fibromy-
algia syndrome had progressed sufficiently since the decision in Black to
permit the admission of expert testimony. The plaintiff in Vargas brought
suit after a tractor trailer accident, alleging trauma from the accident had
caused his fibromyalgia. The district court admitted expert testimony of a
doctor who testified that the accident had caused the plaintiff to develop
symptoms of fibromyalgia syndrome. However, the court found that the
two studies produced by the plaintiff in support of the expert's testimony
either expressly disavowed the conclusion that trauma causes fibromy-
algia or acknowledged that then present data and literature were insuffi-
cient to conclude causal relationships exist between trauma and
fibromyalgia. The court held these studies only bolstered the conclusion
in Black that expert testimony concerning a link between trauma and
fibromyalgia is not sufficiently reliable; thus, the admission of the expert
testimony was an abuse of discretion. The court did not hold that expert
testimony concerning the link is permanently foreclosed because medical
science might someday determine with sufficient reliability that a causal
relationship between trauma and fibromyalgia syndrome exists. 2
In Bocanegra v. Vicmar Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that expert
testimony regarding the effects of marijuana on a driver's reaction time is
permissible. After the trial court excluded testimony on the causal con-
nection between marijuana use and accidents, the Fifth Circuit found that
the expert had testified extensively that studies have demonstrated that
marijuana use impairs cognitive functions, including those related to the
operation of a motor vehicle for at least twelve hours after the acute high
wears off. The Fifth Circuit found that the toxicologist's knowledge and
training in the field of toxicology would be helpful to the fact finder, not
because it would have explained the connection between marijuana and
the accident at issue, but because it explained the effect of recent inges-
tion of marijuana on an individual's cognitive functions, including percep-
tion and reaction time, which are both critical factors in any accident.
The Fifth Circuit thus found that the trial court had erred in finding that
the toxicologist's failure to point to a causal connection between the
driver's marijuana use and the accident at issue rendered his testimony
1. Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
2. Vargas v. Lee, 317 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2003).
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unhelpful to the jury.3
B. THE STATE ROBINSON CASES
The Texas Supreme Court addressed expert witness qualifications dur-
ing this Survey period in Roberts v. Williamson, a medical malpractice
case. At issue was the court of appeals's approval of the trial court's deci-
sion to allow a board certified pediatrician to testify regarding the nature
and effect of the plaintiff's neurological injuries. The defendant ap-
pealed, relying upon Broders v. Heise,4 which upheld the exclusion of
emergency room physician testimony about neurological injuries. Unlike
the physician in Broders, however, the pediatrician in Roberts had studied
the effect of pediatric neurological injuries and had extensive experience
advising parents about the effect of those injuries. The pediatrician based
his opinions on his experience, his medical training and education, the
plaintiff's diagnostic test results, and the diagnostic results from an early
childhood development specialist. He also relied upon MRIs and CT
scans and the interpretation of those tests by a pediatric neurologist
whose qualifications the defendant did not challenge. The pediatrician
also consulted several peer-reviewed medical journal articles and text-
books on pediatric neurology. The Texas Supreme Court held that al-
though the pediatrician was not a neurologist, the record reflected that he
had experience and expertise regarding the specific causes and effects of
the plaintiff's injuries. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting his testimony on matters pertaining to those neurological
injuries.5
The Waco Court of Appeals addressed the reliability of expert testi-
mony in In re J.B. after the trial court allowed expert testimony notwith-
standing the lack of any independent support of the expert's
methodology. A mother challenged the expert testimony of a doctor of-
fered by Child Protective Services on the issue of her parenting abilities
and whether termination of her parental rights would be in the child's
best interests. The mother contended, and the court of appeals agreed,
that Child Protective Services failed to demonstrate that a parenting as-
sessment conducted by the doctor was based on a reliable methodology.
Applying the Robinson reliability factors, the court examined the doc-
tor's testimony, finding that the doctor's reluctance to allow independent
review made his assessment subjective in practice. Further, the doctor's
inability to name any groups, studies, or reports supporting or using his
methodology weighed against the reliability of his methodology. Addi-
tionally, the doctor proffered no testimony, other than his own, concern-
ing the technique's potential rate of error or the general acceptance of his
technique by the relevant scientific community. The doctor also admitted
that he employed his parenting assessment almost exclusively in court-
3. Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2003).
4. Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. 1996).
5. Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003).
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room settings, which weighed against the reliability of his methodology.
Thus, the court found that because Child Protective Services had offered
only the testimony of the doctor to establish the reliability of this meth-
odology and had no specific independent sources to support the reliabil-
ity of this methodology, the trial court had abused its discretion in
admitting the doctor's testimony.6
The reliability of expert testimony was also addressed in Praytor v.
Ford Motor Co., in which the plaintiff alleged that her sinusitis and
asthma were caused by exposure to chemicals released when her air bag
deployed. The defendant challenged the plaintiff's experts' reliability and
filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. The trial court
granted the motion, finding no evidence of causation because both of the
plaintiff's experts were unreliable. The plaintiff first offered the affidavit
of a doctor certified in pulmonary medicine who opined that the plain-
tiff's asthma and sinusitis were caused by the chemicals from the air bag.
However, the doctor was not an expert on asthma, the causes of asthma,
whether the deployment of air bags can cause asthma, or on the toxicity
of chemicals released when air bags deploy. He did not testify that his
theory had been tested, subjected to peer review, or generally accepted
outside of the courtroom by the relevant scientific community. The phy-
sician also failed to explain what literature he read or whether there were
any peer-reviewed studies supporting his theory of causation. The court
further found that the physician's treatment of two patients with similar
symptoms following accidents in which an air bag deployed did not con-
stitute an epidemiological study that could be tested or peer-reviewed.
Although the plaintiff's second expert was an independent consultant
on automotive safety design and vehicle crashworthiness who was famil-
iar with the air bag system that was in the automobile owned by the plain-
tiff, he professed no knowledge of the possible causes of respiratory
illness. His theory that the air bag system released toxic materials that
caused respiratory injury had also not been tested or subjected to peer
review, and there was no indication that his technique had been generally
accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community. The plaintiff ar-
gued that the independent consultant's opinion was reliable because
there was no analytical gap in his logic and because it was based upon a
physician's opinion that chemicals from the air bag caused the symptoms.
However, the court found that the independent consultant's conclusion
was not supported by verifiable data and that the physician's opinion on
which the consultant relied was unreliable. 7
In Tamez v. Mack Trucks, Inc., the Tamez family sued Mack Trucks
after Abram Tamez was killed when his vehicle overturned and burst into
flames. The Tamez family alleged that a defect in the fuel system of the
Mack truck was the producing cause of the fire that injured Tamez. Mack
6. In re J.B., 93 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied).




Trucks moved to exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony on the grounds
that the opinions were not sufficiently reliable. The court of appeals first
addressed the reliability of the testimony of plaintiffs' expert on post-
collision fuel-fed fires. The court found that the expert's opinion that a
defect in the truck's fuel system was the cause of the fire that injured
Tamez was based on the application of his knowledge, training, and expe-
rience to the underlying data in the case. Because the expert's opinion
did not involve science, the court applied the analytical gap test rather
than the Robinson factors. The court held that the expert had properly
identified the underlying facts he relied upon in arriving at his conclusion,
explained the methodology he used, showed how he applied this method-
ology to the underlying facts of the case to support his conclusion, and
discounted other possible sources of the fire. The court also found that
the expert provided a link between his observation and his conclusions
and had used objective and relevant data in arriving at his conclusion in
his examination of the underlying data. Ultimately, the court of appeals
concluded that his testimony detailing his vast experience with post-colli-
sion fuel-fed fires, coupled with his testimony concerning the application
of his knowledge and experience to the underlying data in the case, suffi-
ciently demonstrated that the opinions he drew were reliable, and the
trial court had abused its discretion in excluding his testimony.
The plaintiff's second expert did not fare as well. The expert concluded
that the cause of the fire was diesel fuel that escaped from the fuel tank of
the Mack truck Tamez was driving. The court of appeals agreed with the
trial court that there was an analytical gap in the expert's testimony be-
cause he failed to set forth the basis for his opinion that a battery cable
was the ignition source of the fire. Because the expert stated his conclu-
sion without describing the methodology used to arrive at his conclusion,
the trial court was not required to admit opinion testimony connected to
the underlying data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.8
In Reed v. Granbury Hospital Corp., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony in a medical negli-
gence case. The patient and his family contended that because the pa-
tient was not administered the drug t-PA, he was significantly and
permanently disabled from a stroke. The plaintiffs' experts on the stan-
dard of care of hospitals concerning the administration of t-PA were
stricken because neither were familiar with hospital protocols for ad-
ministering t-PA. Although the first expert was board certified in emer-
gency medicine, a doctor on the emergency medical staff at two Los
Angeles area hospitals, a contributing author to a textbook on managed
care in emergency medicine, and regularly administered t-PA to stroke
patients whose conditions qualified them for it, the record did not show
that the doctor possessed any special knowledge about what protocols,
policies, or procedures a hospital of ordinary prudence would have had in




place. The plaintiffs' second expert, a neurologist who had thirty years of
experience treating stroke patients, testified he was familiar with the t-PA
literature, was competent to administer t-PA, was familiar with and quali-
fied to offer an opinion regarding the standard of care for treating acute
stroke patients, and had some experience in developing hospital proto-
cols, but he had not developed a t-PA protocol. The court of appeals held
that because the doctors were not familiar with hospital protocols for the
administration of t-PA to stroke patients, with the possible exception of
the hospitals in which they practiced, the trial court had not abused its
discretion by concluding that the experts were not qualified to testify
about the standard of care applicable to the hospital.9
The Houston Court of Appeals addressed for the first time the admissi-
bility of a medical examiner's opinion that a death was a suicide in Texas
Workers' Compensation Commission v. Wausau Underwriters Insurance.
The decedent's body was found on a fifth floor awning with no witnesses
who had seen him fall and little physical evidence due to extreme weather
conditions. The assistant medical examiner's investigation was limited to
an autopsy, which revealed that the cause of death was a crushed chest,
abdomen, and pelvis. Based solely on police investigative reports, the
medical examiner determined that the decedent had committed suicide.
After the decedent's widow's application for workers' compensation
death benefits was denied, the Texas Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion held an administrative case hearing and found that the death was not
the result of suicide. The insurance company subsequently filed an ad-
ministrative appeal challenging that decision. The trial court initially de-
termined that the medical examiner was not qualified as an expert on
suicide and excluded all opinions stating the ultimate conclusion that the
decedent had committed suicide.
During the course of the trial, however, the trial court determined sua
sponte that the decedent's widow had opened the door to this previously
excluded testimony, and, as a sanction, allowed in the medical examiner's
testimony, the death certificate that indicated suicide, and the autopsy
that concluded the death was a suicide. The jury found that the decedent
had committed suicide, and the administrative decision was set aside.
The court of appeals found that the decedent's widow had not opened the
door to excluded testimony, and the trial court had thus erred in sanction-
ing her, but that the error did not constitute reversible error because the
evidence admitted was admissible for other reasons. The court of appeals
held that the trial court erred in concluding that the medical examiner
was not qualified to render an expert opinion regarding the manner of
death in addition to the cause of death because the medical examiner had
over nineteen years of experience, including significant experience with
death resulting from falls from heights. In addition, the medical exam-
iner's job involved performing autopsies and reviewing investigation re-
9. Reed v. Granbury Hosp. Corp., 117 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no
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ports to determine the cause and manner of death. The court therefore
found that the trial court would not have abused its discretion if it had
later decided to admit the medical examiner's expert testimony, and,
therefore, the error was harmless.10
In an involuntary commitment case, the El Paso Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the expert qualifications of a foreign medical resident. The ap-
pellant appealed a judgment ordering his commitment for temporary in-
patient mental health services. At the hearing on the mental health appli-
cation, the state presented as an expert witness a resident in his second
month of a four-year program in clinical psychiatry. The appellant chal-
lenged the reliability of the doctor's testimony because he lacked board
certification. After the state established that the doctor had passed the
licensing exams to practice medicine in the United States and that he had
been certified as an expert in the courts of Pakistan over one hundred
times to testify on psychiatric issues, the court allowed the doctor to tes-
tify as an expert. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court
erred in accepting the doctor as an expert in the field of psychiatry be-
cause the physician was a student and therefore could not be qualified as
an expert absent a significant demonstration of skill, experience, and
training. The court of appeals disagreed, stating that although not all re-
sidents have the proper knowledge and credentials to testify as experts on
all medical topics, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting
this doctor as an expert because he had received a medical degree in Pa-
kistan, had passed the requisite exams to become licensed in Texas, had
undergone a one-year rotation in psychiatry in Pakistan, had examined
many patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, and had done research on
psychotropic drugs."
In Wolfson v. Bic Corp., the Houston Court of Appeals reviewed the
exclusion of expert testimony in a wrongful death and survival action. In
this case, a woman was found dead in her home from first and second
degree burns. Her family brought suit alleging that she was engulfed in
flames as she lit a cigarette with a defective butane lighter. On appeal,
the plaintiffs challenged the trial court's order granting Bic's motion to
exclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony. The court of appeals held that
the expert's conclusion that a design defect in the lighter was the cause of
death was developed through a series of assumptions, and the expert had
not observed, performed, or attempted to perform any tests which would
duplicate or verify a failure to extinguish in a similar lighter. The expert
also relied heavily on his own subjective assumptions that debris entering
the lighter caused it to explode, had not published any work on his the-
ory, was not aware of any such publication, did not provide any evidence
relating to the potential rate of error, offered no evidence as to whether
the failure to extinguish was generally accepted as valid by the relevant
10. Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Wausau Underwriters Ins., No. 01-01-00955-
CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 8325 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 25, 2003, pet. filed).
11. In re L.C.F., 96 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.).
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scientific community, did not demonstrate any non-judicial uses that had
been made of his theory, and had admitted that critical items for his study
were never recovered for examination. The court of appeals thus af-
firmed, holding that the expert had formed a conclusion and then im-
properly based an opinion on that conclusion. 12
Norstrud v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. underscores the importance
of adequately objecting to expert testimony at the trial court level. In
Norstrud, homeowners sued their insurance company for refusing to pay
to repair damage to their home's foundation. The jury found that the
damage to the foundation was not caused by an accidental discharge,
leakage, or overflow of water from the homeowner's sprinkler system
and, therefore, the home's damage was not covered by the insurance pol-
icy. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by admitting the testimony of the insurance company's expert
because the expert's resistivity imaging tests, which involved placing elec-
trodes along the top of the ground, running electricity through the elec-
trodes, and determining the water concentration of an area of ground by
the electrical conductivity of the ground, were unreliable. The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals examined the record as a whole and concluded
that the expert's resistivity imaging testing and the results of that testing
were simply one tool he used in reaching his opinions and conclusions
that the sprinkler leak did not cause the foundation damage. Because the
plaintiffs did not challenge the balance of the expert's testimony or meth-
odology, the court of appeals held that the trial court could have reasona-
bly concluded that the expert's ultimate opinions were grounded in
unchallenged scientific method and procedure that amounted to more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation, regardless of the resis-
tivity imaging testing results.13
III. PRIVILEGES
A. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed what constitutes privi-
leged information under the rules of evidence and the Health and Safety
Code in In re Fort Worth Children's Hospital. After suit was filed con-
cerning the care and treatment of four premature infant patients who re-
ceived E-Ferol, a vitamin E solution that was later recalled by the FDA,
the trial court ordered the hospital to produce the admitting paperwork
of all infants who had received the same drug. Arguing the information
was privileged under Rule 509 of the Texas Rules of Evidence 14 and Sec-
tion 241.152 of the Health and Safety Code,15 the hospital sought manda-
12. Wolfson v. Bic Corp., 95 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
denied).
13. Norstrud v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 97 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, no pet.).
14. TEX. R. EVID. 509.
15. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.152 (Vernon 2001).
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mus relief from the trial court's order. Section 241.152 provides that a
hospital or its agents or employees may not disclose health care informa-
tion about a patient to any person other than the patient or the patient's
legally authorized representative without written consent. 16 The court re-
jected the hospital's argument, holding that Section 241.152 "does not
make 'health care information' privileged," but "merely imposes liability
on a hospital for disclosing health care information in violation of the
statute. 1 7 The court also held that because the hospital had not carried
its burden of proving that the documents sought were subject to the phy-
sician-patient privilege of Rule of Evidence 509, the information was not
subject to the physician-patient privilege. 18
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals also considered the physician-patient
privilege in In re W.E.C. In this termination of parental rights case, the
appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence priv-
ileged communications with her drug treatment counselor. The court
held that because the patient had disclosed the same information to nu-
merous other parties, including case workers, therapists, and her friends,
she waived the physician-patient privilege. 19
B. TRADE SECRET PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court of Texas clarified the trade secret privilege in In re
Bass, a case in which non-participating royalty interest owners sought dis-
covery of the mineral estate owner's geological seismic data to prove that
the mineral estate owner had breached an implied duty to develop its
land. The court applied the Restatement of Torts six-factor trade secret
test, acknowledging a court of appeals split on whether the six factors
should be weighed as relevant criteria, or whether a person claiming
trade secret privilege must satisfy all six factors before trade secret status
would apply.20 The court adopted the majority position that a party
claiming a trade secret "should not be required to satisfy all six factors
because trade secrets do not fit neatly into each factor every time. '21 The
court also held that other circumstances could be relevant to the trade
secret analysis. Ultimately, the court found that since the mineral estate
owner had at all times maintained the confidentiality of the data, the data
was kept in a secured vault, the data's monetary value was between
$800,000 and $2,200,000, and the cost of duplicating the data would run
between $800,000 and $2,200,000, the seismic data and its interpretations
were trade secrets protected by the Texas Rules of Evidence. 22
16. Id.
17. In re Fort Worth Children's Hosp., 100 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, no pet.).
18. Id. at 585-88.
19. In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
20. The Trade Secret Privilege is addressed by Texas Rule of Evidence 507.
21. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003).
22. Id. at 741.
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C. PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
The peer review privilege was applied in In re Tollison, a medical mal-
practice action. The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to compel deposition testimony regarding peer review commit-
tee records obtained by the plaintiffs from a previous lawsuit by the doc-
tor against a hospital, arising out of the doctor's suspension of privileges.
The court stated that since a doctor may use such confidential informa-
tion for legitimate internal business and professional purposes, including
use in the doctor's own defense, without waiving the privilege, the court
could not find that the trial court had committed a clear abuse of discre-
tion in upholding the privilege. However, the court also emphasized that
it did not hold that the peer review privilege cannot be waived by public
disclosure or that plaintiffs may not inquire about particular subjects rele-
vant to proving their cause of action simply because they may be touched
upon in peer review documents. Rather, the court observed that al-
though the trial judge had applied the law, "it seems unfair and illogical
that this statute could prevent plaintiffs from using information available
to, and publishable by, any newspaper reporter. Common sense dictates
there must be some point at which privilege ceases to serve its intended
purpose. " 23
Discovery issues involving the peer review privilege also were ad-
dressed in Wheeler v. Methodist Hospital, a defamation and business dis-
paragement suit brought by a doctor against a hospital. After the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, the doctor ap-
pealed arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to compel
the production of discovery. The court of appeals held that non-privi-
leged documents, such as documents possessed by the hospital as a custo-
dian of a patient's medical records, do not fall under the medical peer
review privilege, even if the medical peer review committee has reviewed
them. 24 "A doctor affected by a peer review decision is also entitled to
written copies of any recommendations or final decisions of a medical
peer review committee that could result in an [action against the doc-
tor." 25 Finally, a physician alleging malice is entitled to documents he
either furnished to or received from a medical peer review committee.
The court held that the peer review privilege does not bar a doctor from
obtaining documents within the public domain that a peer review com-
mittee reviews or considers, recommendations or final decisions of the
medical peer review committee that could result in censure, communica-
tions between the doctor and the medical peer review committee, and
documents for which the hospital or the peer review committee had
23. In re Tollison, 92 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
24. The Texas Occupation Code Sections 160.007-008 provide that records or determi-
nations of or communications to a medical peer review committee are not subject to sub-
poena or discovery and are not admissible as evidence without a waiver of privilege. TEX.
OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 160.007-.008 (Vernon 2001).




waived privilege. The trial court had thus erred in issuing a blanket ruling
denying all of the doctor's discovery requests.26
D. OTHER PRIVILEGES
The El Paso Court of Appeals rejected application of the little known
"human subjects protection privilege" in In re Jobe Concrete Products,
Inc. The plaintiffs residing near a quarry claimed negligence and nui-
sance against the quarry operator due to blasting noise and emissions of
fine particulate matter. The plaintiffs' expert witness evaluated potential
property value losses in the neighborhood adjacent to the quarry partially
through a telephone survey of area residents that revealed how the his-
tory of complaints and environmental violations by the quarry affected
real estate purchasing decisions. Defendants, through disclosures, re-
quested all documents that had been provided to, reviewed by, or pre-
pared by or for the expert. The plaintiffs objected to the defendants'
request for disclosure, arguing the documents were protected by the
human subjects protection privilege and that federal law protected any
information regarding the identities of the survey participants from dis-
closure.27 After the trial court ruled that the plaintiffs were not required
to produce participant identification, the defendants sought mandamus to
compel production. The court of appeals held that while it agreed with
the public policy underlying federal regulations protecting survey partici-
pants' confidentiality and anonymity, it did not believe that federal regu-
lations created a privilege in this case. The court of appeals also held that
the Texas Rules of Evidence do not recognize a human subjects protec-
tion privilege, and no Texas case law has asserted or accepted such a
privilege. 28
The San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed how the discoverability
of privileged documents may be affected by the designation of experts in
In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. In this case, the plain-
tiff made a claim against an insured's policy after an accident. After State
Farm denied coverage, plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the
insured and then sued State Farm, alleging that it had wrongfully refused
to defend the insured. During discovery in the case, State Farm withheld
certain documents on the grounds that they were privileged. State Farm
subsequently designated the two employees who had investigated plain-
tiff's original claim as non-retained experts who might express opinions
concerning the handling of the claim made by plaintiff. In response, the
plaintiff filed a motion to determine whether the documents were privi-
leged. After a hearing, the trial judge ruled that except for attorney-cli-
26. Id. at 645-46.
27. The plaintiffs alleged that 45 C.F.R. Section 46.101 applied. That regulation
merely states that each subject shall be provided with "[a] statement describing the extent,
if any, to which confidentiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained." 45
C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(5) (2004).




ent privileged documents, the documents were discoverable. The judge
reasoned that State Farm had waived any other privilege by designating
the employees as expert witnesses. Immediately after the hearing, State
Farm de-designated the employees as expert witnesses and filed a motion
to reconsider the trial court's ruling. The trial judge denied the motion
and found that the withheld documents contained facts that related to the
case and were known to and created by the experts and were accordingly
discoverable, that once the experts were de-designated, the documents
were no longer discoverable, and that State Farm's decision to de-desig-
nate was a tactical move and was, therefore, not permitted.
State Farm filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting the court
of appeals to vacate the order denying State Farm's motion for considera-
tion and to permit State Farm to de-designate the two expert witnesses or
rule that the documents in question were still privileged. The court of
appeals found that there were no allegations that the parties had bar-
gained to suppress testimony and that, according to State Farm, there was
nothing before the trial court to show that its de-designation was for an
improper purpose. However, the court of appeals held that the circum-
stances surrounding the de-designation supported the trial court's ruling,
since the timing of the de-designation reasonably led to the inference that
State Farm de-designated the experts to protect or conceal their testi-
mony. Because concealing testimony is an improper purpose, the court
of appeals held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in refus-
ing to permit the de-designation.
State Farm then argued that the documents in question were privileged
and that the privilege had not been waived by designating the expert wit-
nesses. State Farm argued that the trial court had erroneously relied
upon the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.3(e), 29 which provides that
the facts known by an expert that relate to or form the basis of the ex-
perts' mental impressions are discoverable by the opposing party. State
Farm argued that the documents were covered instead by Rule
192.3(e)(6), 30 which states that documents provided to, reviewed by, or
prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of a testifying expert's testi-
mony are discoverable. Because the items sought to be discovered in this
case were documents, the court of appeals ruled that subsection six rather
than subsection three applied. Because the documents in question were
created for the plaintiff's lawsuit against the insured and not generated
for his lawsuit against State Farm, the documents were not provided to,
reviewed by, or prepared by or for the experts in anticipation of the ex-
perts' testimony in this lawsuit. Accordingly, State Farm did not waive
the privilege in relation to the documents by designating expert witnesses,
and the court of appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion
29. TEX. R. CIv. P. 192.3(e)(3).
30. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e)(6).
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by ordering State Farm to produce the documents. 31
IV. SPOLIATION
The Supreme Court of Texas clarified the use of spoliation instructions
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, a negligence action brought by a Wal-
Mart customer after a Wal-Mart employee accidentally "knocked one or
more decorative reindeer from a high shelf onto the plaintiff's head and
arm." 32 During discovery, the plaintiffs sought the offending reindeer
but, Wal-Mart claimed they had all been sold or thrown away. The miss-
ing reindeer became important when the parties offered contradicting ev-
idence at trial about the composition and weight of the reindeer in
question. While plaintiff "testified that the reindeer were made of wood,
each weighing as much as ten pounds," Wal-Mart "maintained that the
reindeer were made out of papier mich6 and weighed only five to eight
ounces each."'33
Based on Wal-Mart's failure to keep the reindeer, the jury was given a
spoliation instruction and ultimately found Wal-Mart negligent. The
court of appeals affirmed the verdict. On the issue of the spoliation in-
struction, the supreme court held:
[B]efore any failure to produce material evidence may be viewed as
a discovery abuse, the opposing party must establish that the non-
producing party had a duty to preserve the evidence in question....
Such a duty arises only when a party knows or reasonably should
know that there is a substantial chance that a claim will be filed and
that evidence in its possession or control will be material and rele-
vant to that claim.34
In this case, "Wal-Mart argue[d] that it had no duty to preserve the
reindeer as evidence because it had no notice that they would be relevant
to a future claim" and "it did not learn of the claim until all of the rein-
deer had been disposed of in the normal course of business. '35 The su-
preme court agreed, finding that even after the plaintiff learned he had
injured his neck, nothing in the record suggested that he had informed
Wal-Mart of his claim prior to filing suit six months later. Nor was there
any evidence Wal-Mart had learned of his claim in any other way. The
supreme court thus held that the plaintiff had failed to show that Wal-
Mart disposed of the reindeer after it knew or should have known there
was a substantial chance that there would be litigation and that the rein-
deer would be material to it, and the trial court had abused its discretion
in submitting the spoliation instruction to the jury.36
31. In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 100 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002) (org. proceeding).
32. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 720 (Tex. 2003).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 722.
35. Id. at 722.
36. Id. at 718.
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A spoliation instruction was found proper in Cresthaven Nursing Resi-
dence v. Freeman, in which the plaintiffs sued a nursing residence for
damages resulting from the care and treatment received by their mother,
which allegedly resulted in her death. After receiving a spoliation in-
struction concerning missing records, a jury found that the nursing resi-
dence had negligently caused the injury and death and awarded plaintiffs
survival damages and wrongful death damages. On appeal, the nursing
residence claimed the "trial court erred in submitting a spoliation instruc-
tion in the jury charge because the three elements of the spoliation com-
plaint were not established and the defendant rebutted the spoliation
presumption with a reasonable explanation. '37 Because one of the plain-
tiffs "had visited the nursing home seeking information concerning her
mother's condition days prior to her hospitalization and death and had
requested a copy of her mother's records," the court of appeals held that
the "trial court could have concluded that there was a duty on the part of
the nursing residence to preserve the records."'38 The appellate court also
found sufficient evidence to raise the issue of spoliation. Specifically,
there was inconsistent testimony of a nurse as to whether or not she was
asked to make late entries for days that she did not actually work, incon-
sistencies between a nurse's records showing that the patient was eating
and talking on the days before death and the testimony of a nurse's aide
and plaintiffs which stated that she was not, and a nurse's notes for a day
which may have been missing but were not shown conclusively to have
actually existed. The court stated that although this evidence was not
particularly strong, it did give rise to a scintilla of evidence which sup-
ported the spoliation instruction. 39
In Stephens v. Dolcefino, the Houston Court of Appeals addressed spo-
liation in the context of the discovery rule. After a television station,
KTRK, videotaped a conversation between the plaintiffs with a pager-
camera, it broadcast the footage of the conversation but without sound.
The plaintiffs sued KTRK for violations of privacy based on the alleged
non-consensual recording of the conversation. The sound from the
pager-camera tape was erased before trial and before being produced to
appellants. KTRK "claim[ed] that the tape was recycled in the normal
course of business, but [plaintiffs] claimed that the tape was intentionally
erased."'40 The existence of the audible portion of the tape was significant
to the plaintiffs' discovery rule defense to the statute of limitations. On
appeal, the defendant "argue[d] that it had negated the discovery rule as
a matter of law because whether the pager-camera recorded the court-
yard conversation audibly was disputed and could not be objectively veri-
37. Cresthaven Nursing Residence v. Freeman, No. 07-02-0011-CV, 2003 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1187, *1 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Feb. 5, 2003, no pet.).
38. Id. at *2.
39. Id.




fied since the audiotaped portion no longer existed. '41 The court of
appeals disagreed, stating that the reason the sound from the videotape
"could not be reviewed was because KTRK erased it."'42 Whether done
in the usual course of business or as an act of spoliation, "a defendant
cannot unilaterally destroy the principal object needed to verify a wrong
and then argue that a plaintiff cannot verify the wrong because that ob-
ject is missing."43
V. SANCTIONS
In Spohn Hospital v. Mayer, the Texas Supreme Court reversed an
award of sanctions ordering that specified portions of witness statements
be taken as established facts at trial as a discovery sanction for the hospi-
tal's late production of those witness statements. In this medical negli-
gence case, the plaintiffs sued Spohn Hospital, alleging that the
negligence of the hospital's staff resulted in the death of their father. Al-
though the plaintiffs propounded requests for disclosure, the defendant
failed to produce written statements from a telemetry technician and vari-
ous nurses that indicated that immediately prior to the patient's death, he
had called for a nurse four times and that the patient had been restrained.
Thirty-one days before trial the hospital voluntarily produced the state-
ments, stating that it had withheld them based on attorney-work product,
but that recent case law had convinced them the statements were discov-
erable. The plaintiffs moved for sanctions, arguing that the statements
had a direct bearing on the issue of breach of the standard of care and
that the late production prejudiced the plaintiffs' case. The court of ap-
peals agreed with the hospital that the trial court had abused its discre-
tion in ordering the sanctions because there was no direct nexus among
the offensive conduct, the offender, and the sanction imposed, and be-
cause the sanctions were excessive. The supreme court agreed, holding
that although sanctions are generally directed against the alleged abuse,
the record contained no evidence of whether the counsel or their clients
were responsible for the discovery abuse. Additionally, the record was
silent regarding the consideration and effectiveness of less stringent sanc-
tions. Because the sanctions imposed were the type that would inhibit
the presentation of a party's claim, and they were imposed as a result of a
late production, the harmful conduct was insufficient to justify the sever-
ity of the sanctions imposed. The supreme court thus held that the trial
court had abused its discretion in ordering that the specified portions of
the witness statements be taken as established facts at trial.44
In Villegas v. Texas Department of Transportation, the San Antonio
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's order striking an expert witness
due to untimely disclosure of the expert's affidavit and report. Although
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2003).
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the plaintiffs' expert had been timely disclosed, an affidavit incorporating
a preliminary professional engineering report, a resume, and 162 pages of
supporting data and material (filed in response to a no-evidence motion)
had not been disclosed at all. The trial court struck the expert affidavit
and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plain-
tiffs appealed, arguing that they had timely designated the expert and had
supplied the defendants with two boxes of materials, which included the
expert's conclusions and some supporting data. The court of appeals held
that because the plaintiffs failed to establish good cause for failing to
timely disclose the expert's affidavit and incorporated data, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in striking the plaintiffs' expert. 4 5
Death penalty sanctions were upheld by the Dallas Court of Appeals in
Response Time, Inc. v. Sterling Commerce, Inc. In this case, Response
Time, a company that employs and places programmers in the financial
industry, recruited an employee of Sterling and placed him at a different
company to oversee the installation of a program that he had worked on
while at Sterling. Sterling sued Response Time for tortious interference
with contractual relations, breach of contract, theft of trade secrets, mis-
appropriation, and unfair competition. The parties subsequently entered
into an agreed temporary injunction, which prevented any changes in the
employee's job status at his new company pending trial on the merits.
The injunction, however, was quickly violated, and the employee began
working on the contested program. In response, the defendant filed defa-
mation counterclaims.
In support of its defamation counterclaim, Response Time produced
notes and interrogatory responses that purported to detail conversations
in which prospective clients declined to work with Response Time be-
cause of statements made by Sterling employees. Although the president
of Response Time testified in support of the notes, he later confessed
they had been fabricated. After Response Time withdrew its counter-
claims, Sterling moved for sanctions on the basis of the fabricated notes,
concealment of the violation of the injunction, and other discovery
abuses. The trial judge granted the motion and entered an order striking
all of Response Time's pleadings. The court of appeals affirmed, conclud-
ing that the sanctions bore a direct relationship to the offensive conduct.
The court disagreed with Response Time's argument that the perjury and
fabricated evidence had no bearing on the defendant's defenses to the
misappropriation claims, because Response Time hid its injunction viola-
tion for two years and failed to cooperate in discovery. The court found
that the trial judge had thoroughly analyzed and considered the imposi-
tion of lesser sanctions and found them inappropriate. The court of ap-
peals agreed with the lower court's findings and concluded that in light of
Response Time's deliberate and callous conduct, the sanctions imposed




were not excessive. 46
VI. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS OF NOTE
A. HEARSAY
The business record exception to hearsay was addressed in Whacep,
Inc. v. Congress Financial Corp., after a finance company seized the ac-
counting records of a bankrupt business and then sued to recover out-
standing account amounts. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that the bankrupt company's records were not admissible as business
records because the finance company did not generate the documents.
The court noted that the sponsoring witness of a business record need not
be the creator of the record or even an employee of the company keeping
the record. Here, the sponsoring witness testified that his company was
very involved on a daily basis with monitoring the records. The court
affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding that all parties had a strong inter-
est in the accuracy of the records. 47
B. EXPERT REPORTS AND AFFIDAVITS
In two companion cases, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
thirty-day grace period in connection with the deadline for filing expert
reports in medical malpractice actions. In Walker v. Gutierrez, the su-
preme court reviewed the applicability of the Medical Liability and Insur-
ance Improvement Act, the standard for review for a trial court's ruling
on a grace period under the Act, and the circumstances under which a
mistake of law will negate a finding of intentional conduct or conscious
indifference under the Act. In this medical malpractice case, the plain-
tiffs filed expert reports that summarized medical records and stated that
the defendants had deviated from standard medical care and that their
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. The defendants moved to
dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for failure to provide expert reports that rep-
resented good faith efforts to comply with Section 13.01 of the Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.48 Plaintiffs responded that the
reports complied with the statute and that if they did not, they were enti-
tled to a thirty-day grace period under Section 13.01(g) of the statute. At
the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs' attorney testified that
although he knew that the plaintiffs' claims were governed by the statute
and he was familiar with the statute's requirements, he did not compare
the expert reports with the statute to confirm compliance. He admitted
that the reports did not comply with the statute because the standard and
violation of the standard of care was missing.
46. Response Time, Inc. v. Sterling Commerce, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 2002, no pet.).
47. Whacep, Inc. v. Cong. Fin. Corp., No. 03-02-00111-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS
4130 (Tex. App.-Austin May 15, 2003, no pet.).
48. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4590i.
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The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs'
motion for reconsideration. The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying
the plaintiffs' request for a thirty-day grace period because there was un-
controverted evidence that the failure to timely file a sufficient report was
due to a mistake as to the necessary contents of an expert result and not
the result of conscious indifference. Granting the petition for review, the
supreme court first ruled that a party who files a timely but inadequate
expert report may seek relief under the grace period provisions of the
statute. The court held that the appropriate standard of review for the
denial or grant of a grace period under the statute is an abuse of discre-
tion standard. Applying that standard, the court addressed when a grace
period is warranted, concluding that although some mistakes of law may
negate the finding of intentional conduct or conscious indifference enti-
tling the claimant to a grace period under Section 13.01(g), not every act
of a defendant that could be characterized as a mistake of law is a suffi-
cient excuse. The court held that when a plaintiff files a report that omits
one or more of the statute's required elements, a reportedly mistaken
belief that the report complied with the statute does not negate a finding
of intentional or conscious indifference. Accordingly, such a mistake is
not a mistake of law that entitles claimant a grace period under Section
1301(g). 49
In Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Fischer, a case decided on the
same day, the Texas Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Walker that a
purportedly mistaken belief that a report complies with Section 13.01
does not negate a finding of intentional or conscious indifference. In this
case, the plaintiff timely filed an expert report that stated that the nursing
care at the defendant hospital was below the standard of good nursing
care, but that omitted the necessary standard of care and any causal con-
nection between the conduct and injury. The defendant moved to dismiss
the case, claiming that the report did not comply with Section 13.01. The
plaintiff argued that the report complied, and alternatively requested a
thirty-day grace period if the report was insufficient because it was the
result of a mistake and not an intentional act of conscious indifference.
Although the plaintiff's counsel believed the report was adequate when
filed and argued that the fact that she filed the report along with bonds
demonstrated that she did not act with conscious indifference, the trial
court dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied the plaintiff a thirty-day grace period. The supreme court,
referring to its decision in Walker, held that the trial court had not abused
its discretion in denying the grace period and determined that plaintiff's
failure to file an adequate expert report was not the result of accident or
mistake.50
49. Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. 2003).
50. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Fischer, 111 S.W.3d 67 (Tex. 2003).
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In Lerer v. Lerer, the appellants challenged a trial court's judgment
enforcing a mediated settlement agreement, arguing that the appellant
suffered from a medical condition which caused him not to understand
what he was signing. The appellants contended that the trial court erred
in excluding the affidavit of a psychiatrist who treated appellant, any ref-
erences to the psychiatrist, and any references to testifying experts re-
viewing the psychiatrist's affidavit. The appellants argued that the
affidavit should be admissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 70351 and
70552 because it was reviewed by the appellant's treating physician and by
the psychiatrist testifying for the appellees. Because the appellees' psy-
chiatrist testified that he had reviewed, but not relied on the affidavit,
there was no testimony that the treating physician had relied upon the
affidavit. Because the appellants admitted that they wished to introduce
the affidavit because a psychiatrist's conclusions were necessary to rebut
those of the appellees' expert psychiatrist, the court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the affidavit. The court
noted that it would have been unfairly prejudicial to the appellees to have
the jury hear the affidavit when appellees had no opportunity to cross-
examine the expert or review the records of his treatment of appellant. 53
C. RELEVANCE
The El Paso Court of Appeals addressed Texas Rule of Evidence 61354
concerning prior inconsistent statements in Denney v. Dillard Texas Op-
erating Ltd. Partnership. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that she was
fired because she sought workers' compensation for an injury, while the
defendant argued that the plaintiff was terminated because of a nondis-
criminatory absence-control policy. After defense witnesses expressly
testified that managers had no authority to extend leave to injured work-
ers beyond six months, the plaintiff attempted to impeach the witnesses
using the defendant's interrogatory responses indicating that other em-
ployees were allowed longer leaves of absence before they were termi-
nated. The defense argued that these other employees worked at
different locations and were on leave for different reasons and should
thus not be considered in this case. The trial court agreed and excluded
the evidence, and plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals found error,
holding that the evidence was relevant for impeachment purposes and
admissible under Rule 61355 as an inquiry regarding prior inconsistent
statements. The court stated that by not allowing in the evidence, the
jury was left with the misleading impression that employees were always
51. TEX. R. EVID. 703.
52. TEX. R. EVID. 705.
53. Lerer v. Lerer, No. 05-02-00124-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 8371 (Tex. App.-
Dallas Nov. 26, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).




terminated once their leave of absence exceeded six months.56
The Tyler Court of Appeals addressed the relevance of subsequent re-
medial measures in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman. Guzman, an employee
of an independent contractor hired by Tyson, sued Tyson after he was
injured while performing his job as a chicken catcher. After Guzman was
awarded damages for physical pain and mental anguish, as well as for
future lost earning capacity, Tyson appealed, arguing that the trial court
committed reversible error by allowing Guzman to present to the jury
various subsequent remedial measures implemented to prevent future ac-
cidents because the evidence was prejudicial and not admissible under
the rules of evidence. Tyson further argued the evidence was inadmissi-
ble for purposes of showing control because it had already stipulated that
it had sufficient control over the independent contractor to require work-
ers to wear safety gear. Guzman countered that the exception to the gen-
eral rule still applied because Tyson had not stipulated to all areas of
control, and had not specifically acknowledged that it had the ability to
control the manner and means by which the contractor accomplished the
objective of the contract. The court of appeals held that because Guzman
was required to prove that Tyson exercised some control over the subcon-
tractor's work in order to show that Tyson owed him a duty and because
Tyson had not stipulated to all areas of control, the issue of control was
controverted and the evidence of subsequent remedial measures was
properly admitted.5 7
D. ADR CONFIDENTIALITY
The Supreme Court of Texas addressed the confidentiality provisions
of the ADR statute in In re M.S., in which the mother in a parental rights
termination case argued that the admission of a memorandum of agree-
ment between her and Child Protective Services violated the confidential-
ity provisions of the ADR statute.58 Since the ADR statute states that
communications relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dis-
pute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure
are confidential, and the agreement in this case was not a communication
but an agreement between the parties, the supreme court disagreed. In
addition, the agreement clearly stated in two places that it was subject to
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which provides that "agreements be-
tween attorneys or parties concerning the pending suit must be in writing,
signed and filed in the record of the cause to be enforceable," 59 and the
agreement specifically noted that it could be attached to an order of the
court as an exhibit. Therefore, the court held that the agreement was not
a confidential communication protected by the ADR statute. 60
56. Denney v. Dillard Tex. Operating Ltd. P'ship, No. 08-01-00442-CV, 2003 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4066 (Tex. App.-El Paso May 8, 2003, no pet.).
57. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.).
58. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon 2002).
59. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
60. In re M.S., 115 S.W. 543 (Tex. 2003).
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